



Interview Summary: Deputy Commissioner Michael Duheme, Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Deputy Commissioner Michael Duheme was interviewed by Gordon Cameron, Shantona Chaudhury, Yves Côté, and Allison McMahon on October 11, 2022. Questions about this summary should be directed to Ms. McMahon.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme also participated in a panel interview of several senior Canadian Mounted Police (“**RCMP**”) officials on September 7, 2022 (the “**RCMP Panel Interview**”). This supplementary interview was convened primarily to address documents produced after the RCMP Panel Interview and to follow up on points discussed in that interview. This summary should be read in conjunction with the summary of the RCMP Panel Interview.

Text contained in [square brackets] are explanatory notes provided by Commission Counsel to assist the reader.

Background

Deputy Commissioner Duheme is responsible for the RCMP’s federal policing services. His background is addressed in more detail in the RCMP Panel Interview summary.

Intelligence

Special Threat Advisories

[Special threat advisories (“**STA**”) are intelligence products created by the RCMP’s Ideologically Motivated Criminal Intelligence Team (“**IMCIT**”), which is part of the Federal Policing National Intelligence unit (“**FPNI**”).¹]

Deputy Commissioner Duheme explained that the RCMP does not have set criteria to decide when to issue a special threat advisory. He stated that when there is an unfolding event that could have a national impact, he typically asks for an intelligence product that can be shared with law enforcement, government, and other partners. This includes events like the Pope’s recent visit to Canada or a major gathering of public figures that could give rise to security concerns.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme said that he was not aware of a particular tipping point that caused IMCIT to issue the first STA concerning the Freedom Convoy. He did not

¹ RCMP Institutional Report at para. 125, DOJ.IR.00000011.



recall whether IMCIT produced the initial STA at his request, or whether the decision to produce the STA was initiated by IMCIT.

According to Deputy Commissioner Duheme, IMCIT products relating to the Freedom Convoy were distributed within the RCMP and to other law enforcement agencies. They were also shared with government, including the Privy Council Office (“PCO”). Deputy Commissioner Duheme advised that Lisa Ducharme [the Director of Strategic Intelligence at the time of the Convoy, who was interviewed by the Commission later the same day] was best placed to answer questions about IMCIT products, including the STAs.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that he typically reviews the STA that is distributed to the law enforcement community. If he requires more information, he will ask for the raw version. He noted that the STAs typically included a “third party rule” disclaimer, which allows the RCMP to share the intelligence product with a select audience and prevent further distribution of it without permission.

Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism

Deputy Commissioner Duheme explained that within the RCMP, FPNI and Federal Policing National Security (“FPNS”) have joint responsibility for ideologically motivated violent extremism (“IMVE”). FPNI creates strategic products concerning IMVE threats, whereas FPNS prepares tactical products that relate to criminal investigations. FPNS does not deal in raw intelligence.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that both the FPNS and local police of jurisdiction have a role in the investigation of IMVE-related criminal offences. The federal policing mandate includes the investigation of national security matters and, in particular, terrorism offences. Where there is a threat by a known terrorist group or an IMVE-related criminal offence that may result in terrorism charges, FPNS will investigate. Where there is no evidence of terrorism, or insufficient evidence to lay terrorism charges, the police of jurisdiction will maintain the investigation.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme noted that the motivation behind a criminal offence is not always apparent at the outset of an investigation. As an example, Deputy Commissioner Duheme pointed to a stabbing that occurred at a Toronto massage parlour [in February 2020]. Through its investigation, the Toronto Police Service found that the suspect had strong “incel” beliefs. Because of this, the crime was potentially ideologically motivated, such that the investigation fell within the RCMP’s national security mandate.

Intelligence-Gathering during the Convoy

[During the RCMP Panel Interview, Deputy Commissioner Duheme had stated that the OPP took the intelligence lead from RCMP when the Freedom Convoy crossed the



Manitoba-Ontario border.² Commission Counsel asked about the role of the FPNI and FPNS after that occurred.]

Deputy Commissioner Duheme clarified that there was no specific handover of the intelligence lead. Rather, when it became clear that the Convoy was coming to Ottawa, police agencies began to share intelligence, including through the OPP-led Project Hendon. This occurred before the Convoy arrived in Ottawa.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that throughout the Convoy, the FPNI continue to produce strategic documents, and the FPNS continued to monitor and collect open source information concerning persons of interest.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme explained that the RCMP created the Combined Intelligence Group (“**CIG**”) on January 28 or 29. The CIG brought together several key partners, including the Ontario Provincial Police (“**OPP**”), Ottawa Police Service (“**OPS**”), Service de police de la Ville de Gatineau, Sécurité Publique MRC des Collines-de-L’Outaouais, and others. The RCMP led the CIG from a management perspective, but every CIG partner was responsible for putting the products together. The CIG would collect information from RCMP divisions and prepare a situation report for the Commissioner about what was going on nationally.

Once the Freedom Convoy reached a certain size, the RCMP established a national Gold-Silver-Bronze (“**GSB**”) command, which assumed responsibility for gathering information from across the country and briefing Commissioner Brenda Lucki.

Pre-Arrival Planning

Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that he did not have any expectation about when the protesters would leave Ottawa. When the Freedom Convoy first started, the OPS told the RCMP that it was in contact with the organizers, and that the participants were going to leave their trailers at a park and do a slow roll through Ottawa. Deputy Commissioner Duheme said that, based on this information, he was not then concerned about the situation.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme acknowledged that the STAs suggested that some protesters could be in Ottawa for the long haul. He indicated that as more intelligence came in, and as the Convoy situation became more problematic, the RCMP brought in additional resources and ramped up its protective policing posture.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that the presence of trucks and trailers in downtown Ottawa concerned the RCMP from a protective policing standpoint. He agreed that a truck can be weaponized and said that it is always a concern that someone will

² RCMP Panel Interview Summary, p. 5.



park a weaponized truck in a vulnerable location. As well, the OPS was unable to guarantee safe routes in the downtown area due to the presence of the Convoy, which made it difficult for the RCMP to fulfill its protective mandate.

OPS Planning and Intelligence

Deputy Commissioner Duheme noted that the OPS received the same intelligence as the RCMP. However, the OPS did not request resources from the RCMP until after the Convoy was entrenched in Ottawa. He said that he was unsure why the OPS did not seek additional resources in light of the intelligence [to the effect that some protesters were indicating an intention to stay in Ottawa for a prolonged period]. He speculated that it was because the OPS felt it had good relationships with the organizers and felt comfortable with the plan that had been agreed with the organizers.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme also noted that the threats described in intelligence do not always materialize. For example, the intelligence for some events in Ottawa has warned of potential threats, and RCMP resources have been allocated accordingly, but the threatened activity has not occurred.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme said that he was not sure whether anyone in the RCMP tried to alert the OPS to the significance of the intelligence, i.e., that the protest would not be a typical slow roll through the city. He said that if the RCMP were not comfortable with the OPS' response to a piece of intelligence, they would raise the issue at a low level and escalate to higher levels as necessary. However, he observed that telling another law enforcement agency that it has something wrong can be problematic. At the end of the day, it fell to the OPS to decide how to respond.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that, unlike other cities [once they saw what happened in Ottawa], the OPS did not have a plan to shut down the city before the convoy. As a consequence of the Convoy, the OPS now has such a plan, and used part of it during "Rolling Thunder" [a protest that took place in Ottawa in May 2022].

While acknowledging that hindsight is easy, Deputy Commissioner Duheme expressed the view that the OPS should have done more contingency planning before the Convoy arrived in Ottawa. He explained that it is important to develop a plan to fall back on if the original plan does not work out. The OPS did not do so, and as a result, it was required to adjust the original plan as the situation unfolded.

Requests for Resources

Deputy Commissioner Duheme confirmed that in preparation for the Convoy, the RCMP reached out to the OPS to offer assistance. However, the OPS did not make any requests for resources prior to the Convoy's arrival. When the OPS did request assistance, the RCMP deployed 50 resources. As the situation began to boil over, the OPS sought further resources.



Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that the RCMP started to gather resources for a deployment in Ottawa early on. When asked why it took several days to fulfill the RCMP's commitment to provide 50 resources to the OPS, and whether the RCMP could have done anything to speed up mobilization, he indicated that it would be necessary to do a deeper dive with those responsible to figure out what the impediments were to faster mobilization.

In respect of the numbers of resources mobilized, Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that the numbers were challenging to track. For example, some of the officers sworn in to assist the OPS were members of the Tactical Support Group (“**TSG**”). TSG members cannot be used for frontline policing. As well, there were times when the RCMP brought people in to support the OPS, but they weren't assigned to do anything. He thought this might have been because the RCMP does not have many police cars in Ontario [where it is not the police of jurisdiction] so there weren't enough cars for the RCMP officers deployed to Ottawa to use. Ultimately, 1,100 RCMP members were deployed to assist the OPS and to provide protective policing.

Memorandum of Agreement

Deputy Commissioner Duheme explained that he felt it was important to enter into a memorandum of agreement (“**MOA**”) with the OPS in order to confirm that the City of Ottawa would be responsible for the cost of the resources provided by the RCMP. It was important that it be understood that the RCMP would be compensated for the provision of its resources, and the MOA is required to set the terms for this.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that the RCMP enters into MOAs on a regular basis, including for secondments and other deployments with law enforcement agencies. The purpose is to set out the relationship between the two agencies on paper and, including the terms on which the RCMP will be able to recover its costs. Deputy Commissioner Duheme agreed that it would be a good practice to have a standard form MOA prepared for urgent deployments in order to avoid the loss of time that can result from that administrative barrier.

The Structure of Policing in Ottawa

The RCMP-OPS-OPP Relationship

Deputy Commissioner Duheme expressed the view that when the OPS requires assistance, it should request that assistance from the OPP. It is only when the OPP has exhausted all other resources that the RCMP should provide assistance.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme explained that the relevant legislation suggests that the OPS should seek assistance from the OPP before it looks to the RCMP. In his experience, this is consistent with other jurisdictions: municipal police forces go to their provincial



police resources when necessary. In Quebec, for example, municipal police forces must go to the Sûreté du Québec when they require assistance.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme suggested that the OPS' continued reliance on the RCMP reflects the close working relationship that the two forces developed when [in the past, before the creation of the Parliamentary Protective Service in 2015] the RCMP provided security on Parliament Hill. Because of that role, the OPS and RCMP would jointly plan for events like as Canada Day. Deputy Commissioner Duheme suggested that Ottawa and the OPS have not adjusted to the fact that the RCMP no longer plays this role.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme emphasized that the OPS' reliance on the RCMP for additional resources must change. He explained that it is difficult for the RCMP to provide frontline policing resources to the OPS. In Ottawa, most RCMP officers are involved in federal policing. This involves a different set of personnel with a different skillset than frontline officers. To provide officers with the appropriate skills and experience to the OPS, it is necessary to bring in resources from across the country. This process takes some time, because officers had jobs and families and cannot necessarily leave immediately. As well, bringing resources into Ottawa means that the RCMP may not be able to fulfill its mandate elsewhere in the country. So, both logistically and legally, Ottawa should look first to Ontario for policing resources when required.

The Role of the Parliamentary Protective Service

Commission Counsel asked whether Deputy Commissioner Duheme thought that the PPS would be more effective if it was integrated into the RCMP.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme thought not. He said that the RCMP and PPS should be kept separate, because they fulfill different roles. The role of the PPS is to provide security to officials and visitors on Parliament Hill. This is not a police function and does not require police experience.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme noted that he was the first Director of the PPS when it was created in 2015. He explained that the PPS reports to the Speaker of the House in respect of administrative and budgetary matters, but to the RCMP on the operational side. He described this reporting structure as “intertwining” the executive and legislative branch, and stated that this was difficult to manage when he first started as PPS Director.

Police Jurisdiction in Ottawa

Commission Counsel asked Deputy Commissioner Duheme whether police jurisdiction in Ottawa is overly complicated, and whether it would be simpler for the RCMP to provide local policing.

In response, Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that the lines of jurisdiction are clear. He said that it was not logical for the RCMP to become the police of jurisdiction in Ottawa because of a single incident. He expressed concern that some may want the RCMP to



assume jurisdiction over Ottawa because they want to have direct input into local policing matters.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme added that the RCMP was not in a position to step in, take over and solve the problems that arose in Ottawa during the Freedom Convoy. He explained that doing more than supporting the OPS would have required that the RCMP bring in frontline members from elsewhere in the country, who would not have known the city they were expected to police. He expressed the view that having the RCMP fly in and move aside the police of jurisdiction would not have helped anything. It would also have impacted the RCMP's ability to meet its operational requirements outside of Ottawa.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme further noted that there was some expectation in the public that when the federal government invoked the *Emergencies Act*, it would result in the RCMP coming into Ottawa and taking over. This was never contemplated and would not have worked for the reasons stated earlier.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme's Notebook

Commission Counsel asked Deputy Commissioner Duheme to provide context for several entries in his notebook.

February 3, 2022

The first entry is dated February 3, 2022.³ It reads as follows:

1320 Call OPS
Plan and it safely, literally working as everything
CAF must stay at the table for a final plan
Tajiri is not sure probably not doing it
Don't have a final recommended plan.
Hard medium - Soft
No police solution
nothing in P.S. Act that says that
he has to find a way police solution
Tomlinson looking for the last word

³ PB.NSC.CAN.00008074, at p.56.



Deputy Commissioner Duheme explained that this note refers to a call with Chief Sloly. He said that calls with Chief Sloly would typically include RCMP Commissioner Lucki, OPP Commissioner Thomas Carrique, and each of their deputies. He remembered Chief Sloly saying that nothing in the *Police Services Act* says that he (i.e., Chief Sloly) has to find a 100% police solution to the Convoy situation.

February 6, 2022

Commission Counsel referred Deputy Commissioner Duheme to an entry dated February 6, 2022.⁴ It reads as follows:


1400 Min Blair:
- Act. Out Sol Gen,
Chief doesn't have to go through Minister
State exceed the capacity mass to break the Sol Gen to request
OPP.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that this note reflects [Emergency Preparedness] Minister Bill Blair's explanation of the process OPS Chief Peter Sloly would need to engage in to obtain assistance. Specifically, Chief Sloly has to reach out to the Province to engage the OPP. Deputy Commissioner Duheme emphasized that this is appropriate, given that the OPP is the top law enforcement agency in Ontario.

The next entry Commission Counsel discussed is dated February 6.⁵ It reads as follows:

⁴ PB.NSC.CAN.00008074, at p. 67.

⁵ PB.NSC.CAN.00008074, at p. 67.



Deputy Commissioner Duheme indicated that this note reflects a question that Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety, had. He stated that the first line under “Min PS” reads, “when is this ending, [and] how”. He said that these were recurring questions posed by government, including elected officials, the Privy Council Office, and Public Safety.

The next note reads, “if OPS can’t bring the Convoy to end”. Deputy Commissioner Duheme thought that the end of this sentence was likely, “then who can?” The final note states, “Did not feel secure downtown Wellington St.”

Underneath the redaction for solicitor-client privilege is a note that reads, “RCMP needs to be prepared, need to be ready”. Deputy Commissioner Duheme explained that this was a note of things to follow up on, and that it meant that the RCMP needed to have the right resources in place to assist the OPS.

February 7, 2022

Commission Counsel referred Deputy Commissioner Duheme to a note dated February 7.⁶ It reads as follows:

⁶ PB.NSC.CAN.00008074, at p. 72.



Date _____

1000 PD, 600 PO Teams, 100 support staff 100

* Peter said he's going to ask double of what he needs

* Planner from our shop integrated Planning cell. what are the resource require

Deputy Commissioner Duheme said that this note reflects a call with Deputy Chief Steve Bell of the OPS concerning the OPS' request for resources. He indicated that Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins of the OPP might also have been on the call, but he could not be certain.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme explained that during the call, Deputy Chief Bell told him that OPS Chief Peter Sloly would ask for double the number of resources he actually needed. This is reflected in the note, "Peter said he's going to ask double of what he needs."

They also discussed the development of a planning cell that would bring together subject matter experts ("**SMEs**") from the OPS, OPP, and RCMP. Deputy Commissioner Duheme explained that at that point in time, OPS was planning on its own, without input from other agencies. He said that involving a planner from the RCMP would provide better insight into the OPS' operational requirements. The note, "Planner from our shop" and "integrated planning cell, what are the resources required" relates to this expectation. Deputy Commissioner Duheme clarified that this was separate from the earlier point concerning Chief Sloly's intention to double his resource request.

February 9, 2022

Commission Counsel then referred Deputy Commissioner Duheme to several notes dated February 9, 2022.⁷ The first note reads as follows:

⁷ PB.NSC.CAN.00008074, at p. 80, 81.



1500 Min.
MinSec. MinSec Present, Hill
Temperature going on how MPs feel
SAA
Thank us.

- Rundown of meeting
- Sloly present. he's calling the shot
- No plan is not sharing anything

Tonight 20 people. 10 cars demand by Sgt
to Victor Monette. No idea why.

- Sloly permissible. I wish to read the written
text
- OPS met about this stuff to our office
- Sloly ran the meeting, an announced all the
questions. appeared angry somewhat out of control
- Spoke about his name in St Gen
- Validity of the plan provided us.

Today 11pm or 0000 Tuesday without any specific
2 ops. Country and several riders including
several country and at Surrey Station
No plan to hold the site and they leave


- 1 day to 1 1/2 day off.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme said that he believed this note concerned a protective policing meeting, because the Sergeant-at-Arms was present, and that Chief Sloly was present at this meeting. Based on his notes, it was the Deputy Commissioner's recollection that Chief Sloly only allowed Patricia Ferguson [OPS Acting Deputy Chief (Investigations, Intelligence and Information Command) and Major Incident Commander during the Convoy] to speak from a prepared text during the meeting. Deputy



Commissioner Duheme was informed that Chief Sloly would not typically permit his staff to speak at meetings.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme indicated that towards the bottom portion of the page, his notes refer to Chief Sloly's intention to clear the protest sites at Coventry Road and at the intersection of Sussex Drive and Rideau Street. The RCMP was concerned that Chief Sloly did not have a concrete plan to hold those sites after they were cleared. Deputy Commissioner Duheme's notes on this subject continued on the following page:



According to Deputy Commissioner Duheme, these notes refer to Chief Sloly's intention to clear the protest sites at Wellington Street and Sir John A. Macdonald Parkway. He explained that the RCMP's SMEs felt that Chief Sloly was driven by timeline rather than



safety. He did not have a backup plan, an emergency plan, or a decisive action plan. When speaking about development of the plan, Chief Sloly indicated that he would not proceed unless he was guaranteed success. In Deputy Commissioner Duheme's experience, a requirement of guaranteed success in such circumstances is not reasonable.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme said he was unsure whether the OPS had tow trucks available for use in these areas. He was aware that the OPS had considered using tow trucks designed for buses to move vehicles involved in the protest, but that it was unable to do so because the tow truck drivers' union contracts or union rules did not allow them to engage in this work.

Commission Counsel referred Deputy Commissioner Duheme to an entry later on February 9, 2022.⁸ The entry reads as follows:

⁸ PB.NSC.CAN.00008074, at p.85.



Let's not worry about OTTAWA
Priority OTTAWA
attempt to move the whole LE capability
Watersloo. Hamilton needed in Toronto
3 sections
OPR - Demand
Public Order 4c - together
- Chris Harkiss
Hold OTTAWA manage forest
Enforce in Windsor
- Should not be any enforcement across
provinces
Carson - Parks will pay and commit
the chief.
Sense and hold.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme explained that his notes at the top of the page state: "Let's not worry about Ottawa" and "Priority [is] Ottawa". He explained that this reflected a shift in focus from Ottawa to Windsor, where the RCMP mobilized on February 10. In his words, it captured the thought, "Let's not concentrate on Ottawa now, because there is no plan there for us to be part of, and we need to help in Windsor."

Communication via Teams

Deputy Commissioner Duheme identified document PB.NSC.CAN.00008032 as a copy of a Teams chat that he participated in. He explained that Teams was used to provide additional information to Commissioner Lucki while she was in meetings. These chats would typically occur during briefings. He said that he participated in chats with the Commissioner during some meetings relevant to the convoy.



The Integrated Planning Cell

Commission Counsel referred Deputy Commissioner Duheme to OPP00004283, which is a plan dated February 10, 2022 produced by the Integrated Planning Cell (“**IPC**”).

Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that he did not recall whether he had seen this plan. He stated that he was unsure why the OPS was not listed as an author of the plan, since it was a member of the IPC. He noted that around February 10, there was some friction within the IPC, which he attributed to the fact that Chief Sloly wanted to have a say on everything that the IPC produced.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme explained that operational plans are developed by the Incident Commander and subject matter experts. In the RCMP, there is no requirement that either the Commissioner or any higher ranking officer sign off on an operational plan before the Incident Commander can implement it. In some cases, however, an Incident Commanders will present an operational plan to the Commissioner, but only to keep her apprised about what the RCMP was planning to do.

According to Deputy Commissioner Duheme, his impression was that Chief Sloly wanted to actually sign off on the final plan in respect of the Freedom Convoy (though at a certain point, Chief Sloly said his sign off was not necessary). He noted that, in the course of the police response to the Convoy, several Incident Commanders didn’t see eye to eye with Chief Sloly and were relieved of or left their duties.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that Commissioner Lucki was frustrated to have to brief members of the federal government on the status of the OPS plan, because the RCMP had no control over when that plan would be delivered. When Chief Sloly did provide a plan, there was frustration with the pace that he was proposing.

Gold-Silver-Bronze Structure

Deputy Commissioner Duheme explained that a GSB command is a structure used to manage an incident or event. During the Freedom Convoy, there was a national GSB command put in place to coordinate the RCMP response to the protests taking place across the country (the “**National GSB Command**”).

A separate GSB was established to coordinate the RCMP’s response to the Ottawa protest (the “**Assist OPS GSB Command**”). Deputy Commissioner Duheme was the Gold Commander of the Assist OPS GSB Command.

Engagement with the Federal Government

The Role of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

When asked about the role that Minister Blair and Minister Mendicino played during the Convoy, Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that they were briefed by the RCMP and



provided support to the RCMP. He indicated that both ministers were anxious to open the Ambassador Bridge port of entry in Windsor and to clear the streets in downtown Ottawa.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme noted that many individuals within the federal government reached in to offer support during the Convoy. He wondered why the Province of Ontario did not do the same.

The Engagement Proposal

Deputy Commissioner Duheme said that he did not think Deputy Minister Rob Stewart's plan to engage the protesters in negotiation (the "**Engagement Proposal**") made its way to him. He explained that Deputy Minister Stewart's plan was developed after speaking to the person in charge of the OPP's Provincial Liaison Team ("**PLT**"). He stated that the RCMP did not really look at the proposal, because the OPP had the relevant subject matter expertise.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme noted that one of the frustrations the planning team experienced was that the PLT was not doing its work. He explained that the PLT's *raison d'être* is to reach out to protest organizers and maintain good relationships, which was not happening. When the integrated plan was operationalized, the PLT ramped up its presence, started to inform protesters of the *Emergencies Act*, and gave them a chance to leave before they were arrested.

The Emergencies Act

When asked about the RCMP's use of the authorities granted under the *Emergencies Act*, Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that it would be difficult to provide statistics identifying each use. He stated that Commissioner Lucki delegated her authority to compel tow truck services [under s. 7 of the *Emergency Measures Regulation*] to OPP Commissioner Carrique. He also indicated that the RCMP used emergency authorities to establish a controlled access zone and to prevent individuals from bringing in supplies.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme stated that the RCMP saw the *Emergencies Act* as a deterrent more than anything else, and that he strongly believes that it was effective in this way.